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THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM ACT:
NON-STATE ACTORS AND FREEDOM FROM
SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT CONTROL
ROBERT C. BLITT*
The International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) recently underwent its
most significant amendment process since being introduced in 1997. Among
the major changes, sponsors of the Frank R. Wolf International Religious
Freedom Act (Wolf Act) proposed adding a new framework to IRFA intended
to address the phenomenon of non-state actors (NSAs) violating the right to
freedom of religion or belief. The impetus for this new mandate, according to
the bill’s sponsors, flowed from the realization that NSAs such as the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL) were wielding religious intolerance to
commit “some of the most egregious religious freedom violations.”
Despite its findings that violent NSAs represented an expanding force
responsible for exposing a significant percentage of the global population to
severe abuses of freedom of religion and belief, the Wolf Act faced an uphill
battle in Congress that necessitated significant compromises to secure its
passage. As a result, the final bill modified or altogether failed to enshrine
certain measures originally proposed to address NSAs. In their place, the Wolf
Act instituted an ambiguous statutory definition for those NSAs that would be
subject to scrutiny under IRFA. Furthermore, while the new “Entity of
Particular Concern” (EPC) designation for NSAs identified as engaging in
“particularly severe violations of religious freedom” appeared to mirror
IRFA’s existing mandatory sanctions regime for “Countries of Particular
Concern,” it fell far short by triggering only a suggestion that the President
* Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. This Article is part of an ongoing
research project addressing the impact of the 2016 Wolf Act Amendments on the International
Religious Freedom Act. The author extends thanks to Elena Pribytkova and Evelyne Schmid, co-chairs
of a workshop on “Human Rights Accountability of Non-State Actors,” held at the 29th biennial World
Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, for
providing an opportunity to present a draft of this Article, and to the workshop participants for their
valuable comments and questions. I am also indebted to my colleague Sibyl Marshall, whose ongoing
support for my research consistently rises above and beyond. Lastly, thanks to AJ Salomone and the
incredibly disciplined team at Marquette Law Review for their professional editorial work finalizing
this Article for print.
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“take specific actions, when practicable, to address [EPC] violations of
religious freedom.”
As this new chapter for IRFA enters its third year, this Article will
demonstrate that the NSA-related provisions present significant challenges for
the U.S. government. To begin the task of fleshing out the nature and impact
of these challenges, the Article focuses on one element of IRFA’s NSA
definition—namely, the requirement that an NSA be “outside the control of a
sovereign government.” After addressing IRFA’s NSA definition and providing
an overview of its implementation to date, this Article turns to a critical
appraisal of how the state control requirement has been implemented to date.
The Article closes with several suggestions aimed at clarifying definitions and
institutional responsibilities to repair current practice and reinvigorate IRFA’s
promise of promoting and protecting the right of all individuals to freedom of
religion or belief.
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 548
II. A HOBBLED DEPARTURE POINT: IRFA’S STATUTORY DEFINITION FOR
NON-STATE ACTORS .......................................................................... 549
III. IRFA NSA ASSESSMENTS IN PRACTICE: THREE YEARS OF
AMBIVALENCE ................................................................................... 551
IV. MEASURING FREEDOM FROM SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT CONTROL ..... 553
V. APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS TO NSAS .... 573
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 577
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent amendments to the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act
(IRFA) introduced new reporting requirements for certain non-state actors
(NSAs) found to be violating the right to freedom of thought, conscience, or
religion and belief.1 This change signaled a potentially significant expansion
of IRFA’s formal mandate, which previously focused on scrutinizing
government conduct. The path to securing these amendments, however,
entailed a lengthy negotiating process in Congress and myriad modifications to
the originally proposed framework for addressing NSAs.2 In addition to
generating a constricted definition for “non-state actor,” these negotiations
1. Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 11–281, §§ 2–3, 301, 130
Stat. 1426, 1426–28, 1433 (2016) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6402, 6442a (2018)).
2. Compare id., with H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. (as introduced by House, Feb. 27, 2015), and H.R.
1150, 114th Cong. (as passed by House amended, May 16, 2016).
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significantly clawed back the likelihood of executive action being directed
against those NSAs designated as “entities of particular concern” (EPCs) for
“particularly severe violations of freedom of religion.”3
Three years later, IRFA’s NSA provisions have made little meaningful
headway. An ambivalent statutory definition for NSAs, indeterminate and
inconsistent implementation by IRFA’s institutional actors—the State
Department and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
(USCIRF)—and executive inaction in the wake of EPC designations have
conspired to leave IRFA’s new framework for combatting NSA-based
violations of religious freedom ineffective and adrift.
To begin the task of fleshing out the nature and impact of these challenges,
this Article focuses on one element of IRFA’s NSA definition—namely, the
requirement that an NSA be “outside the control of a sovereign government.”4
After addressing IRFA’s new NSA definition and providing an overview of its
implementation to date, this Article turns to a critical appraisal of how the State
Department and USCIRF have interpreted the state control requirement. This
appraisal focuses on the lack of clarity concerning the distinction between state
control and state support and takes up the issue of how “autonomous” NSAs
are held to account for obligations derived from international human rights law
(IHRL). The Article closes with several suggestions aimed at clarifying
definitions and institutional responsibilities to repair current practice and
reinvigorate IRFA’s promise of promoting and protecting the right of all
individuals to freedom of religion or belief.
II. A HOBBLED DEPARTURE POINT: IRFA’S STATUTORY DEFINITION FOR
NON-STATE ACTORS
Despite evidencing a desire to scrutinize non-state actors, the final NSArelated amendments to IRFA contained in the Frank R. Wolf International
Religious Freedom Act (Wolf Act) betrayed a central shortcoming:
3. While the final amendments created an “entity of particular concern” (EPC) designation for
certain NSAs, its design only superficially resembles IRFA’s existing “Country of Particular Concern”
(CPC) mechanism. Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act § 102(a)(5). Most notably,
Congressional negotiations over the EPC mechanism resulted in removing the requirement of
mandatory presidential action in the case of NSAs committing particularly severe violations. See
Robert C. Blitt, The Wolf Act Amendments to the U.S. International Religious Freedom Act:
Breakthrough or Breakdown?, 4 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF. 151, 191–92 (2019) [hereinafter Blitt,
Breakthrough or Breakdown?]. With this change, Congress made any executive action directed against
EPCs contingent on presidential discretion. Id.
4. Although IRFA’s other definitional prerequisites for NSAs—significant political power and
territorial control and use of violence—evidence similar deficiencies, due to space constraints they are
reserved for another time.
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Congressional negotiations produced a significant narrowing of the ability
under IRFA to engage the full spectrum of NSAs negatively impacting freedom
of religion or belief.5 The final Wolf Act clearly retreated from the broad NSA
definition provided in the original draft bill.6 Instead, it adopted a restrictive
definition that enabled scrutiny only of those “nonsovereign” entities that:
• exercise[] significant political power and territorial control;
• [are] outside the control of a sovereign government; and
• often employ[] violence in pursuit of [their] objectives.7
On its face, this definition eliminated the ability under IRFA to examine
NSAs that merely “tolerated” or financed violations of religious freedom, or
those that otherwise facilitated discriminatory practices impacting the right to
freedom of religion or belief. But more than this, the adopted statutory
language also established a definition premised on imprecise and vague terms
that unnecessarily complicates the identification of potential NSAs violating
religious freedom. For example, when does an NSA exert “significant”
political power? What amount of territorial control is necessary? How
frequently must an NSA exert violence—and at what level and directed against
whom—before it can be scrutinized under IRFA? And finally, for the purposes
of this Article, what degree of autonomy is enough to demonstrate that an NSA
lies outside the control of a sovereign government?
As the remainder of this Article demonstrates, IRFA’s institutional actors
have opted to ignore the definitional challenges inherent in the statutory
language regarding government control, shrugging off any meaningful effort to
engage with or clarify its substance. Further exacerbating this departure point,
neither USCIRF nor the State Department have divulged a transparent or
consistent methodology explaining how they assess state control. Left
unaddressed, these shortcomings generate unnecessary uncertainty surrounding
IRFA reporting on NSAs and undercut the ability to effectively identify and act
against NSAs violating freedom of religion or belief. More troubling, these
shortcomings risk leaving victims of such violations—as well as the NSAs
violating this fundamental freedom—with the impression that the United States
is not genuinely committed to IRFA’s promise to promote and protect freedom
of religion or belief.

5. See 22 U.S.C. § 6442a (2018).
6. Blitt, Breakthrough or Breakdown?, supra note 3, at 191.
7. Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, § 3(3)(11) (as passed in Senate, Dec. 9,
2016).
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III. IRFA NSA ASSESSMENTS IN PRACTICE: THREE YEARS OF AMBIVALENCE
USCIRF’s 2017 annual report—the first to reflect implementation of
IRFA’s new NSA provisions—echoed the view from Congress that NSAs “are
some of the most egregious violators of religious freedom in today’s world.”8
The report recommended three non-state actors—ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the
Taliban in Afghanistan, and al-Shabaab in Somalia—be designated as EPCs.9
Nearly one year later, the State Department released its first official EPC
designations, which adopted USCIRF’s three EPC recommendations.10
Surprisingly, the State Department added five additional NSAs to its EPC
designations: al-Nusra Front, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), alQa’ida, Boko Haram, and ISIS-Khorasan.11
Weeks after the State
Department’s inaugural EPC designations, USCIRF’s 2018 annual report opted
not to endorse the State Department’s eight EPCs.12 Instead, the Commission
maintained its original 2017 position, still recommending only three NSAs:
ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and al-Shabaab in Somalia.13
At the time, it remained unclear whether USCIRF’s decision to forgo
adding the State Department’s additional five NSAs to its own list of
recommended EPCs was intended to communicate a fundamental difference in
approach to assessing NSA or EPC status, a lack of capacity or resources within
USCIRF to undertake necessary additional analysis and reporting, insufficient
turnaround time between release of the State Department’s EPC designations
and USCIRF’s 2018 Annual Report, or something else. In the words of one
USCIRF commissioner: “Interestingly, the State Department seems to take a
wider view of the EPC category . . . . We welcome this inclusion of more
groups that violate religious freedom as well as clarification on how we at

8. U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ANN. REP. 4 (2017) [hereinafter USCIRF 2017
REPORT].
9. Id. USCIRF’s annual report did, however, assert the Commission would continue “to
report . . . on particularly severe violations of religious freedom perpetrated by non-state actors that do
not meet the [Wolf] amendments’ limited definition because, for example, they do not exercise
territorial control.” Id.
10. Secretary of State’s Determination Under the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom
Act of 2016, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,545 (Mar. 9, 2018).
11. Id.
12. U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ANN. REP. 4 (2018) [hereinafter USCIRF 2018
REPORT].
13. Id.
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USCIRF can be more in synch with the State Department’s understanding of
the parameters of the EPC category.”14
Despite this call for clarification, subsequent USCIRF reporting evidences
the perpetuation of an interpretation gap in applying IRFA’s NSA provisions.15
Rather than endorse the administration’s second set of EPCs, released in
November 2018, USCIRF’s 2019 report flatly acknowledged that its own
“assessment of the statutory requirement that EPCs ‘exercise significant
political power and territorial control’ differs from the State
Department’s . . . .”16 As such, USCIRF’s list of recommended EPCs for 2019
continued to exclude NSAs designated as EPCs by the State Department.17
As the following Section indicates, however, divergent assessments
between USCIRF and the State Department are not restricted to disagreements
over how to interpret IRFA’s requirement that NSAs “exercise significant
political power and territorial control.”18 Rather, these interpretational
differences extend to IRFA’s other NSA criteria, including autonomy from state
control.19 Moreover, while these divergences may at least in part be attributed
to IRFA’s vague statutory language, a review of publicly available materials
indicates that in addressing NSAs and classifying EPCs, neither USCIRF nor
the State Department have taken steps to define or consistently apply IRFA’s
statutory language or provide identifiable or consistent methodologies for their
respective analyses.20

14. Telephone Press Briefing, USCIRF, Telephonic Press Briefing on Annual Report (Apr. 25,
2018),
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF_042518.docx
[https://perma.cc/7U49MJYM]. Curiously, the same commissioner cited Boko Haram as an example of an NSA that
“perpetrate[s] gross religious freedom violations in countries around the world” although USCIRF
omitted this group from its EPC recommendations. Id.
15. See U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ANN. REP. 7 (2019) [hereinafter USCIRF
2019 REPORT].
16. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (2016) (Amendments)). This is a curious framing of the
requirement for significant political power and territorial control, given that IRFA mandates any NSA
scrutinized under the statute satisfy this attribute, not only EPCs.
17. Id. The emerging dynamic surrounding NSAs signals a dramatic break from the convention
governing CPC designation. Instead of USCIRF recommending far more CPCs than the State
Department designates, the EPC process appears to have reversed USCIRF’s and the State
Department’s traditional roles, with the latter venturing a more muscular interpretation of IRFA and
the former cleaving to a more cautious approach.
18. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(6) (2018); USCIRF 2019 REPORT, supra note 15, at 6–7.
19. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(6).
20. At the time of writing, the President had not submitted “a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that describes the reasons for such designation.” 22 U.S.C. § 6442a(b)
(2018).
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In the face of this ongoing ambivalence, both parties risk squandering the
critical opportunity presented by their reporting obligations under IRFA to
explicitly engage with and attempt to resolve fundamental questions still
lingering from the Wolf Act’s drafting history. Without a concerted effort to
remedy these interpretive and analytical shortcomings and provide clearer interinstitutional practices, IRFA’s new NSA provisions risk falling into
irrelevancy.
IV. MEASURING FREEDOM FROM SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT CONTROL
IRFA’s requirement that NSAs be free of sovereign government control
receives de minimis treatment in USCIRF and State Department reporting.
Neither USCIRF nor the State Department offer any general guidance on the
parameters used to interpret or apply the standard of government control.
Likewise, neither institutional actor offers any substantive engagement
concerning this requirement in specific cases of NSAs recommended or
designated as EPCs.21 In this context, reporting evidences little or no discussion
around seemingly crucial questions. To begin, how does IRFA define state
“control”? Does control encompass clear instances of state support? In this
context, should the type of state support provided to an NSA matter? For
example, should humanitarian assistance, travel visas, or diplomatic
recognition be distinguished from the provision or facilitation of funding,
weapons, training, or other logistical assistance? What if this latter support
rises to a level that enables the violent NSA (or state) to undertake previously
improbable actions or otherwise demonstrably expand its freedom of
operation?
Before addressing USCIRF and State Department efforts to identify state
control, it bears asking a preliminary question, namely, why does IRFA seek to
draw a distinction between autonomous and government-controlled NSAs?
This distinction has a long-standing basis under international law and is
intended to help ascertain whether rules of state responsibility are engaged.22
According to state attribution principles, in situations where NSAs are tied back
to state control, their actions can be attributed to the state.23 By the same token,
if such NSAs are linked to the state, state obligations under international law
similarly flow to the NSA.24 Presumably, IRFA excludes consideration of

21. See USCIRF 2019 REPORT, supra note 15, at 6–7; USCIRF 2018 REPORT, supra note 12, at
3–4; USCIRF 2017 REPORT, supra note 8, at 3–4.
22. Vladyslav Lanovoy, The Use of Force by Non-State Actors and the Limits of Attribution of
Conduct, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 563, 573–74 (2017).
23. Id. at 574.
24. Id. at 573–74.
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state-controlled NSAs from its NSA definition because the U.S. government
would address such actors by holding the attributable state directly accountable.
This is a straightforward and conventional approach, whereby the puppet
NSA’s “veil” is lifted to reveal the controlling state. Nevertheless, as the
discussion below indicates, due to IRFA’s content and purpose, the distinction
may ultimately be of limited use.
Congress’s desire to exclude government-controlled NSAs from IRFA’s
NSA definition does not by itself suffice as a guide for understanding how one
proceeds to measure state control. Plainly, applying a strictly construed highbar test for state control would afford IRFA the opportunity to scrutinize a
larger array of NSAs. Such an approach would also appear to align with the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), which has required a finding of “effective
control” before acts of an NSA can be attributed to a given state.25
In Nicaragua, the ICJ ruled that for state conduct “to give rise to legal
responsibility . . . , it would in principle have to be proved that that State had
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of
which the alleged violations were committed.”26 In that case, the Court
concluded the United States’ “financing, organizing, training, supplying and
equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets,
and the planning of the whole of its operation” was insufficient to “attribut[e]
to the United States the acts committed by the contras . . . .”27 From the Court’s
perspective, “[a]ll the forms of . . . participation . . . and even the general
control by the [United States] over a force with a high degree of dependency on
it” would not, without further evidence, enable attribution to the United States
for the contras’ alleged “perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and
humanitarian law.”28
The ICJ’s approach is “regarded by many observers as the governing
standard”29 and has been supported by the UN’s International Law Commission
in its more recent Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).30 Still, others have recognized that sustaining the
25. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Oona A. Hathaway, Emily Chertoff, Lara Dominguez, Zachary Manfredi, & Peter Tzeng,
Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article 1 and State Responsibility for Non-State Actors, 95 TEX. L.
REV. 539, 558 (2017).
30. Materials on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/25,
Arts.
4,
8
(2012),
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ICJ’s strict attribution standard gives rise to a “critical accountability gap,”
whereby states “too often effectively escape responsibility for violations of the
laws of armed conflict” by managing a relationship with the NSA that hovers
below “effective control.”31 This latter approach argues greater flexibility is
necessary on the issue of attribution to hold states more accountable for NSA
actions where a relationship exists but falls below the “effective control”
standard.32
To illustrate the lack of deliberation surrounding IRFA’s requirement that
NSAs must be free of sovereign government control, consider the case of ISIS.
For many years, reports raised significant questions concerning sources of
government support for ISIS activities.33 In 2014, one analyst noted that the
United States “says it does not have evidence that the government of Qatar is
funding . . . [ISIS]. But it does believe that private individuals in Qatar are
helping to finance this group and others like it. And it thinks the Gulf state is
not doing enough to stop this.”34 A subsequent report in Newsweek went
further, claiming “ISIS has accepted funding from government or private
sources in the oil-rich nations of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait—and a large
network of private donors, including Persian Gulf royalty, businessmen and
wealthy families.”35 In early 2015, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
observed that ISIL maintained a different funding model compared to other

https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../legislativeseries/pdfs/volumes/book25.pdf&lang=O
[https://perma.cc/TSF2-MXZ2].
31. Hathaway, Chertoff, Dominguez, Manfredi, & Tzeng, supra note 29, at 542–43, 558; see
also Lanovoy, supra note 22, at 578. On this point, Lanovoy quotes ICJ Vice-President AlKhasawneh: “The inherent danger in such an approach is that it gives States the opportunity to carry
out criminal policies through non-state actors or surrogates without incurring direct responsibility
therefore.” Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 1, 8, ¶ 39 (Feb. 26) (Al-Khasawneh,
Vice-President, dissenting).
32. Id.
33. See infra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
34. Lori Plotkin Boghardt, Qatar and ISIS Funding: The U.S. Approach, WASH. INST. (Aug.
2014),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/qatar-and-isis-funding-the-u.s.approach [https://perma.cc/U83S-Q2EX]. A related report noted Kuwait is the “‘epicenter of
fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria’ according to the Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and
financial intelligence” and that Qatar represents “[a]nother permissive environment for terrorist
financing.” Matthew Levitt & Lori Plotkin Boghardt, Funding ISIS (Infographic), WASH. INST. (Sept.
12,
2014),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/funding-isis-infographic
[https://perma.cc/55SE-ERSA].
35. Janine Di Giovanni, Leah McGrath Goodman, & Damien Sharkov, How Does ISIS Fund Its
Reign of Terror?, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/how-does-isisfund-its-reign-terror-282607.html [https://perma.cc/2SJG-MJU9].
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terrorist groups.36 Consequently, the “overall quantitative value of external
donations to ISIL is minimal relative to its other revenue sources.”37 Still,
FATF concluded that countries are struggling “to fully implement counterterrorist financing measures in accordance with the FATF standards to include
adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, ensuring a robust targeted
financial sanctions regime and creating legal and operational frameworks to
stop, restrain and enable confiscation of cash when reasonable grounds for
suspicion exist of terrorist financing.”38 By 2017, among those countries with
inadequate controls on ISIS financing, the New York Times expressly called out
Saudi Arabia: “Exaggerating or misrepresenting the misdeeds of Qatar and Iran,
while giving the Saudis a free pass, will only benefit Saudi Arabia’s efforts to
expand its regional influence.”39 Some observers have also raised the
possibility that Turkey has supported or continues to support ISIS.40
Despite these consistent and ongoing reports of external funding and
support, USCIRF’s and the State Department’s assessment of ISIS is altogether
disconnected from any consideration of the question of government control.
This oversight leaves observers to wonder what, if any, methodology the parties

36. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCING OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION ISLAMIC STATE
IRAQ
AND
THE
LEVANT
(ISIL)
32
(Feb.
2015),
www.fatfgafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/financing-of-terrorist-organisation-isil.html
[https://perma.cc/3HS4-7J3K].
37. Id. at 18.
38. Id. at 40. Government inaction combatting ISIS financing continued beyond 2015 and is
corroborated elsewhere. LAURENCE BINDNER & GABRIEL POIROT, CENTER FOR THE ANALYSIS OF
TERRORISM,
ISIS FINANCING 2015
20
(May
2016),
http://www.cat-int.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/ISIS-Financing-2015-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CVY8-E9TR] (noting
“ISIS has continually strived for political, economic and religious autonomy. However, it continues
to receive donations from rich businessmen and religious figures and institutions (primarily NGOs) in
the Gulf states.”); Martin Williams, FactCheck Q&A: Is Saudi Arabia Funding ISIS?, CHANNEL FOUR
NEWS (June 7, 2017), https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-qa-is-saudi-arabiafunding-isis [https://perma.cc/36HH-DUJT] (concluding “although the House of Saud may not be
directly financing terrorists themselves—there are almost certainly some difficult and worrying
questions to answer.”).
39. Editorial Board, Fighting, While Funding, Extremists, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/opinion/saudi-arabia-qatar-isis-terrorism.html
[https://perma.cc/76WG-L9EB].
40. Daniel Byman, How States Exploit Jihadist Foreign Fighters, 41 STUD. CONFLICT &
TERRORISM
931,
934–37
(2018),
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1361281
[https://perma.cc/2SKZ-2L69 ] (noting “For years, Turkey was content serving as a valuable logistics
hub and sanctuary for the Islamic State, as it did for much of the Syrian opposition.”); Michael Rubin,
(May
4,
2017),
Is
Turkey
Supporting
ISIS?,
COMMENT.
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/middle-east/turkey/turkey-active-isis-support/
[https://perma.cc/XQE8-JVDQ].
IN
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applied to IRFA’s requirement that NSAs be outside of government control.
Did USCIRF conclude the existing evidence of support did not rise to the
requisite level of control? Did the State Department strictly construe “control”
to require a clear finding that a sovereign government direct the NSA’s
command and control structure? By the same token, did both actors apply the
same criteria, or are they operating under different assumptions where, for
example, government facilitation or condoning of private support for an NSA
might be viewed differently? Without engagement around these questions—or
even a perfunctory but direct conclusion that external support for ISIS did not
amount to government control—IRFA’s institutional actors did little to clarify
or build on the statute’s vague departure point.
This perfunctory engagement carries over to consideration of whether and
how the Taliban, al-Shabaab, and other designated EPCs satisfied IRFA’s
requirement that NSAs be “outside the control of a sovereign government.”
Moreover, in at least several of these cases, even more compelling evidence
exists to suggest that the NSA in question might not be incontrovertibly free
from external state control.
For example, various sources have long reported that “the Saudis—through
private or covert channels—have tacitly supported the Taliban” to “further their
own strategic interests.”41 In addition, Russia “has increased its support for the
Taliban over the last year and a half . . . includ[ing] the sharing of sensitive
intelligence data.”42 According to one observer, “the Taliban have found a
sympathetic ear in Moscow . . . . Taliban successes prompted Zamir Kabulov,
Russia’s special envoy to Afghanistan, to state that ‘Taliban interests
objectively coincide with ours.’”43 Further, Pakistan “has augmented

41. Carlotta Gall, Saudis Bankroll Taliban, Even as King Officially Supports Afghan
Government, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/world/asia/saudiarabia-afghanistan.html [https://perma.cc/S99S-WAW5]; see also Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban:
Exporting Extremism, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 33 (1999); Nic Robertson, Saudis Discover New Funding
Channels
for
Taliban,
al
Qaeda,
CNN
(Jan.
27,
2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/01/27/saudi.terror.funding/index.html
[https://perma.cc/EBF5-LP8M]; Declan Walsh, WikiLeaks Cables Portray Saudi Arabia as a Cash
(Dec.
5,
2010),
Machine
for
Terrorists,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/05/wikileaks-cables-saudi-terrorist-funding
[https://perma.cc/9HSS-624S].
42. Kylie Atwood, U.S. Says Russian Support for Taliban Hurts Peace Process in Afghanistan,
CBS NEWS (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-says-russian-support-for-talibanhurts-peace-process-in-afghanistan/ [https://perma.cc/5KQV-RFU4].
43. Amin Tarzi, Islamic State–Khurasan Province, in THE FUTURE OF ISIS: REGIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 119, 137 (Feisal Al-Istrabadi & Sumit Ganguly eds., 2018) (quoting
Eric Lichtblau, FBI Steps Up Use of Stings in ISIS Cases, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016),
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Afghanistan’s instability by providing intelligence, weapons, and protection to
the Afghan Taliban,”44 and experts continue to debate the extent to which that
country “is committed to Afghan stability or is attempting to exert
control . . . through ties to insurgent groups.”45
Perhaps most glaringly, high-ranking officials in the U.S. military have
expressly acknowledged the burgeoning links between the Taliban and various
sovereign governments:
[The Taliban’s] senior leaders remain insulated from pressure
and enjoy freedom of action within Pakistan safe havens. As
long as they enjoy external enablement, they have no incentive
to reconcile. The primary factor that will enable our success is
the elimination of external sanctuary and support to the
insurgents. Russia has become more assertive over the past
year, overtly lending legitimacy to the Taliban to undermine
NATO efforts and bolster belligerents using the false narrative
that only the Taliban are fighting ISIL-K. Similarly,
neighboring Iran is providing support to the Taliban . . . .46
If this is indeed the case—that the Taliban can avoid reconciliation due to
the external support it receives—how can a meaningful difference be drawn
between state control and mere support? A distinction may exist between the
high threshold of government control and the occasional funding or low-grade

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/us/fbi-isis-terrorism-stings.html
[https://perma.cc/N9V9UYBR]).
44. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Why Pakistan Supports Terrorist Groups, and Why the US Finds it so
Hard to Induce Change, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/orderfrom-chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-so-hard-toinduce-change/ [https://perma.cc/2TJM-YBDW].
45. CLAYTON THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45122, AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND
U.S. POLICY IN BRIEF 8 (2019).
46. The Situation in Afghanistan: Statement Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 115th Cong. 10
(2017) (statement of General John W. Nicholson, Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan),
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Nicholson_02-09-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9B48-7KSC]. See also KENNETH KATZMAN & CLAYTON THOMAS, CONG.
RESEARCH. SERV., RL30588, AFGHANISTAN: POST-TALIBAN GOVERNANCE, SECURITY, AND U.S.
POLICY 27 (2017) (observing “multiple U.S. commanders have warned of increased levels of
assistance, and perhaps even material support, for the Taliban from Russia and Iran.”). U.S. Central
Command has likewise concluded that “Iran continues to use the Taliban to secure its own interests
and to counter the ANDSF’s [Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces] attempts to improve
security conditions across the country.” Great Power Competition: The Current and Future
Challenges in the Middle East: Statement Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 116th Cong. 16 (2019)
(statement of General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, U.S. Cent. Command), [hereinafter Statement of
https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/POSTURE-STATEMENT/
General
Votel],
[https://perma.cc/XU3N-6GPE].
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arming of a violent NSA. Yet, that line arguably blurs when an NSA is reliant
upon such forms of support to the extent it can no longer effectively advance
its desired objectives once that support is removed. Thus, it stands to reason
that certain manifestations of government support or backing may amount to a
form of control. This is not a novel conceptualization of state control. In her
study on terrorist group longevity, Jodi Vittori identified the ability of such
organizations to conduct operations without interference from external
sponsors as one key measure of autonomy.47 In her words, “If actors outside
an organization can dictate the choices of that group, the group’s autonomy is
challenged.”48
Consider a hypothetical government that proffers the following ultimatum
to a violent NSA: We will cut off all sources of assistance we provide or
facilitate (intelligence, weapons, funding, etc.) if your organization carries out
an attack on target X. Or alternatively: We will cut off all sources of assistance
we provide or facilitate if your organization fails to attack target X. In either of
these scenarios, the NSA is faced with a difficult choice: retain what may be
crucial state support by tolerating some manifestation of state control or reject
the ultimatum and potentially risk the NSA’s viability or effectiveness. As
Vittori reasons:
A group whose resourcing is mainly generated externally, such
as from wealthy individuals or state sponsors, will find itself
beholden to the wishes of those sources. Alternatively, an
organization with primarily internal backing—generating its
own means from petty crime, charities under its control, or
ownership of front companies—will not be tied to anyone in
its decision-making process.49
These variations in the origin of resources not only “affect the autonomy of a
terrorist group, but they also affect its capabilities.”50
Returning to the Taliban, one can therefore reasonably argue that its
external support is the lifeblood which enables the group’s ability to perpetuate
certain otherwise unachievable actions. This level of support effectively is akin
to control. Yet despite these operational realities, neither the State Department
nor USCIRF appear inclined to offer a sufficiently unpacked consideration of
the dynamics driving state support to account for such eventualities or for how
they ought to impact IRFA’s required assessment of state control.
47. Jodi Vittori, All Struggles Must End: The Longevity of Terrorist Groups, 30 CONTEMP.
SECURITY POL’Y 444, 444 (2009).
48. Id. at 445.
49. Id. at 447.
50. Id. at 449.
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The pattern of failing to weigh evidence pointing to extensive and direct
governmental support is repeated with other NSAs. Both the U.S. and Somalian
governments “have accused Eritrea of supporting Al Shabaab through weapons
and funding.”51 Beyond individual allegations, however, the UN Security
Council (UNSC) resolved as far back as 2009 that the Eritrean government was
providing “political, financial and logistical support to armed groups engaged
in undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia and regional stability,”
including al-Shabaab.52
After determining that Eritrea’s actions “constitute[d] a threat to
international peace and security,” the Security Council invoked Chapter VII of
the UN Charter to demand, inter alia, that Eritrea “cease arming, training, and
equipping armed groups and their members including al-Shabaab” and “cease
facilitating travel and other forms of financial support to [these] individuals or
entities.”53 In the face of what arguably constituted state attribution, the UNSC
resolution required all UN member states to undertake a host of actions,
including imposing sanctions on Eritrea to prohibit the sale or supply of
“weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment . . . and technical
assistance, training, financial and other assistance, related to the military
activities or to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of these items.”54
Faced with the Security Council’s conclusion that Eritrean support for alShabaab was worthy of international sanction,55 USCIRF and the
administration nevertheless proceeded to recommend and designate the group
as an EPC in the first round of NSA assessments conducted between 2017–
2018.56 In staking out their respective decisions, neither institutional actor

51. Mapping
Militant
Organizations:
Al
Shabaab,
STAN.
U.,
https://web.archive.org/web/20190724182956/http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgibin/groups/view/61 [https://perma.cc/6JN6-AEFG] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). In addition to this
governmental sponsorship, the group also receives financial support from a variety of private donors
located in the United States and elsewhere. Jeffrey Gettleman & Nicholas Kulish, Somali Militants
Mixing Business and Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2013, at A1, A8 (noting two naturalized American
citizens from Somalia were sentenced after fundraising for al-Shabaab under the pretense that
donations were intended for the poor).
52. S.C. Res. 1907 (Dec. 23, 2009). The resolution passed 13-1-1, with Libya voting against and
China abstaining. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6254th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6254 (Dec. 23, 2009).
53. S.C. Res. 1907, supra note 52, ¶¶ 16–17.
54. Id. ¶ 5.
55. The African Union previously called on the United Nations Security Council “to impose
sanctions against all those foreign actors, both within and outside the region, especially Eritrea,
providing support to the armed groups engaged in destabilization activities in Somalia.” Assemb. Afr.
Union Dec. 252 (XIII), at ¶ 16 (July 3, 2009).
56. See USCIRF 2017 REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
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offered a systematic assessment of al-Shabaab’s freedom from sovereign
government control to justify scrutiny of the group under IRFA’s NSA
provisions.57
The State Department’s 2016 International Religious Freedom Report
remained silent as to any linkage between Eritrea and al-Shabaab.58 In contrast,
USCIRF explicitly reported that the U.S. government backed UN Security
Council Resolution 1907 and took additional steps to curb Eritrea’s support for
al-Shabaab, including blocking Eritrean presidential advisor Yemane
Ghebreab’s “property and property interests . . . for [his] financing of alShabaab” and supporting the renewal of UN sanctions in 2016.59 Yet, USCIRF
failed to relate these facts to an assessment of potential government control over
al-Shabaab or how this relationship might impact the group’s consideration
under IRFA.60 More curious still, USCIRF’s 2019 annual report acknowledged
that the UN Security Council voted to lift the decade-old sanctions on Eritrea
“on the basis that the original conditions for sanctions—including support for
al-Shabaab and regional conflict—were no longer evident.”61 Acknowledging
the elimination of Eritrean support for al-Shabaab arguably validates the
contention raised here that a more thorough consideration of the government’s
relationship to the NSA was necessary and justified before 2018.
Turning to Yemen, the status of the Houthis’ freedom from sovereign
government control likewise appears to merit a greater measure of scrutiny than
proffered by USCIRF or the administration. Despite mounting evidence to
suggest an increasing Iranian involvement with the Houthis, the U.S.
administration designated the group as an EPC in November 2018.62 USCIRF
followed this move with its own unsubstantiated recommendation to designate
the Houthis in May 2019.63

57. Id.
58. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Eritrea 2016 International
Religious Freedom Report (2016), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Eritrea-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7FNQ-K85N].
59. USCIRF 2017 REPORT, supra note 8, at 43.
60. See id.
61. USCIRF 2019 REPORT, supra note 15, at 49 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 6. The report simply states that in 2019, “USCIRF recommends that the State
Department designate . . . [the] Houthis in Yemen” as an EPC. Id.
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Iran’s efforts to support the Houthis can be traced back to 2012.64 As the
Islamic Republic’s interest in the group grew, the U.S. raised concerns about
Iranian training and equipping of the Houthis. Still, the administration reasoned
that “Tehran’s direct involvement . . . was limited,”65 and that in its assessment,
“Iran does not exert command and control over the Houthis in Yemen.”66
Media reports at the time echoed this conclusion, citing the Houthi rebels’
disregard of Iran’s recommendation to forego a takeover of Yemen’s capital,
Sana’a, as confirming the absence of state control over the group.67
By 2019, however, the Houthi-Iranian relationship appeared to have grown
deeper and more significant. According to one analyst, “[t]he threat from the
al Houthi movement to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and the Red Sea is unacceptable and has grown, largely through
support from Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ . . . . Iran’s influence over the al
Houthis has increased since the start of the war, and the coalition’s actions have
had little strategic effect.”68 Still, this analyst cautioned, “[t]he al Houthis are
not simply a proxy of Iran. Tehran neither commands nor controls the al
Houthis, though the relationship is deepening.”69
Another take reinforces the inherent tentativeness of this conclusion:
64. Gerald M. Feierstein, Iran’s Role in Yemen and Prospects for Peace, MIDDLE EAST INST.
(Dec.
6,
2018),
https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-role-yemen-and-prospects-peace
[https://perma.cc/3CVK-J7KZ].
65. Warren Strobel & Mark Hosenball, Elite Iranian Guards Training Yemen’s Houthis: U.S.
Officials, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-houthisiran/elite-iranian-guards-training-yemens-houthis-u-s-officials-idUSKBN0MN2MI20150327
[https://perma.cc/YHG8-FEFW]. Already at this point, “Tehran announced the commencement of an
air bridge between Iran and Sana’a . . . operated by . . . a government-controlled airline used by the
IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] Quds Force to ferry trainers and equipment to
warzones. . . . Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian trainers entered on these flights and up to 300 Yemenis
were sent to Iran for training.” Michael Knights, The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to
State Capture, 11 CTC SENTINEL 15, 18 (2018).
66. Ali Watkins, Ryan Grim, & Akbar Shahid Ahmed, Iran Warned Houthis Against Yemen
(Apr.
20,
2015),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/iran-houthisTakeover,
HUFFPOST
yemen_n_7101456 [https://perma.cc/DPW3-WSUF]. A more scholarly treatment reached a similar
conclusion. Thomas Juneau, Iran’s Policy Towards the Houthis in Yemen: A Limited Return on a
Modest Investment, 92 INT’L AFF. 647, 647 (2016) (arguing “The Houthis, however, are not Iranian
proxies; Tehran’s influence in Yemen is marginal.”).
67. Watkins, Grim, & Ahmed, supra note 66.
68. Taking the Lead Back in Yemen: Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs Subcomm. on
Middle E., N. Afr., and Int’l Terrorism, 116th Cong. 5 (2019), (statement of Katherine Zimmerman,
Research Fellow and Critical Threats Project Research Manager, Am. Enter. Inst.) [hereinafter
Statement of Zimmerman], https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20190306/109038/HHRG-116FA13-Wstate-ZimmermanK-20190306.pdf [https://perma.cc/767D-FMVW].
69. Id. at 6.
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The accumulated balance of evidence strongly suggests that
Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have developed powerful
military and technical advisory missions in Yemen since 2014.
....
Iran does not appear to control the Houthi leadership, but it did
ramp up its support to the Houthis at precisely the moment that
their ambitions broadened . . . . The relationship . . . could
remain transactional or it could deepen.70
Other independent analysis follows a similar tact: “The rebels insist, correctly,
that they are independent of Tehran, but they are clearly coordinating closely
with their Iranian ally.”71
The UN’s Panel of Experts on Yemen has confirmed the importance of
Iran’s role in facilitating Houthi activities, adding useful context to any
assessment of state control. Among other findings, the Panel’s most recent
report noted that revenue from the sale of Iranian fuel “was used to finance the
Houthi war effort” and found “that the fuel was loaded from ports in the Islamic
Republic of Iran under false documentation to avoid detection by [UN]
inspections.”72 The Panel also found evidence of “unmanned aerial vehicles
[UAVs] in the Houthi arsenal . . . which showed characteristics similar to the
Iranian-made Ababil-2/T loitering munition and which had been used in Yemen
at least since 2016.”73 Further, the Panel found that funding for the supply of
UAVs “and a mixing machine for rocket fuel” traced back to “individuals and
entities of Iranian origin.”74 These findings reinforced conclusions from prior
reports evidencing Iranian support for the Houthis, including that “Iran violated

70. Knights, supra note 65, at 21.
71. Bruce Riedel, As the Saudis Host International Summitry, Their Yemen Problem Isn’t Going
Away, BROOKINGS INST. (May 28, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2019/05/28/as-the-saudis-host-international-summitry-their-yemen-problem-isnt-going-away/
[https://perma.cc/2TJM-YBDW].
72. Rep. of the S.C., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2019/83 (2019).
73. Id. at 28. Iranian efforts to support the Houthis with advanced weaponry and training has a
longer history. See, e.g., Strobel & Hosenball, supra note 65. See also Rep. of the S.C., at 2, U.N.
Doc. S/2018/68 (2018) (concluding “The Panel has identified missile remnants, related military
equipment and military unmanned aerial vehicles that are of Iranian origin and were brought into
Yemen after the imposition of the targeted arms embargo. As a result, the Panel finds that the Islamic
Republic of Iran . . . failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale
or transfer of [weapons and related material] to the then Houthi-Saleh alliance.”). Iran rejected these
findings as lacking in “authenticity and credibility” and being based on “fabricated evidence.” Id. at
151–52 (App. E to Annex 36: Response of Islamic Republic of Iran).
74. Rep. of the S.C., at 40, U.N. Doc. S/2019/83 (2019). According to the report, “Iran denied
any connection.” Id.
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[the] arms embargo imposed on Yemen by failing to prevent the Houthi rebels
in that war-ravaged nation from obtaining Iranian missiles.”75
Faced with this information, one might endorse the conclusion drawn by
the Congressional Research Service that “[a]lthough Houthi militia forces most
likely do not depend on Iran for all of their armaments, financing, and
manpower; . . . Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah have aided Houthi forces
with advice, training, and arms shipments.”76 Alternatively, the evidence might
tip in favor of a finding of state control emerging or unfolding, as reflected in
the position advanced by U.S. Central Command:
To conceal its culpability, the Iranian regime masks its malign
activities through proxies and surrogates enabled by the Iran
Threat Network (ITN) in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.
....
The conflict in Yemen opened opportunities for Iran, which
continues to provide support to the Houthis aimed at building
a proxy force designed to pressure the SLC [Saudi-led
Coalition] and expand Iranian regional influence.77
Though representing overlapping interests to an extent, the Arab League
and Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) have staked out similar
positions holding Iran accountable for Houthi actions.78 Other states,
75. Rick Gladstone, Iran Violated Yemen Arms Embargo, U.N. Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/12/world/middleeast/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia-armsembargo-un.html [https://perma.cc/SA7Q-WZN5].
76. JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43960, YEMEN: CIVIL WAR AND REGIONAL
INTERVENTION
8
(2019),
https://web.archive.org/web/20190424021932/https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YN9-AQA5].
77. Statement of General Votel, supra note 46, at 31, 34.
78. For example, the Arab League “[c]ondemn[ed] the continued Iranian support for the Houthi
anti-government militias in Yemen.” Al Arabyia English, Arab League Condemns Houthis, Iran’s
ARABIYA
(May
31,
2019),
Behavior
in
Final
Communique,
AL
https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2019/05/31/Arab-League-condemns-Houthis-Iran-sbehavior-in-final-communique.html [https://perma.cc/FH73-QAJN].
For its part, the OIC
“[c]ondemn[ed] in the firmest terms the Iranian-made ballistic missile attack by the Iranian-backed
Houthi militias on Riyadh . . . decrying it as an aggression on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and taking
it as evidence of the Iranian-backed Houthi militias’ refusal to cooperate with the international
community.” Org. Islamic Cooperation [OIC], Regarding the Ballistic Missile Fired by the Houthi
Militias toward Riyadh, ¶ 1, OIC/EX-15-CFM/2018/RES (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.oicoci.org/docdown/?docID=1745&refID=1075 [https://perma.cc/62BL-T977]; see also Org. of Islamic
Cooperation [OIC], On the Attack against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s Embassy in Tehran and
Consulate in Mashhad, ¶ 6, OIC/CFM-46/2019/POL/RES/FINAL (Mar. 1–2, 2019), https://www.oicoci.org/docdown/?docID=4444&refID=1250 [https://perma.cc/3Q7Y-4Q3M] (condemning “Iran’s
interference in the countries of the region including Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, Somalia, and its supplying
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admittedly with their own vested interests, paint a stronger still picture of the
Iranian relationship with the Houthis. For example, according to Yemen’s UN
representative, Houthi “militias have become puppets in the hands of the
Iranian mullahs and regime, which are trying to promote their own sectarian
interests in Yemen.”79 In a similar vein, Saudi Arabia’s permanent
representative to the UN has reasoned:
The Security Council must . . . take appropriate measures
against Iran for supporting the Houthi rebel militias in their
terrorist crimes and their threat to the region’s security and
safety and international peace and security. . . . It is about time
that Iran and its proxy in Yemen, the Houthi rebel militias, be
held accountable for their continued irresponsible and criminal
behaviour.80
Should a demonstrated high level of material state support that persists even
in the face of existing international sanctions amount to sovereign government
control of an NSA under IRFA? The question may not be as abstract as it
appears; at least one analyst’s comments suggest this may be the dynamic
unfolding in the case of the Houthis: “Iranian support remains too limited to
give the Iranians control over al Houthi policies. The IRGC [Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps] certainly would love to have such control and, no
doubt, to provide more support, but the difficulties of getting Iranian agents and
material into al Houthi areas are simply too great.”81
Based on USCIRF’s and the administration’s unsubstantiated treatment of
the Houthis and other NSAs, however, the answer would appear not. But it is
precisely here, given the ambiguity surrounding state control, that a robust and
considered methodology for appraising state control is most necessary. At best,
forgoing such an assessment leaves IRFA’s limitation permitting scrutiny of
only NSAs “outside the control of a sovereign government”82 unacceptably
opaque and ill-defined. But worse, perpetuating this indeterminacy further

of weapons to Houthi militias; and call[ing] on the government of Iran to discontinue any policies
susceptible to fuel ethnic or sectarian disputes and to desist from supporting or financing the terrorist
factions and movements.”).
79. U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8525th mtg. at 24, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8525 (May 15, 2019) (Mr. AlSaadi, rep. of Yemen) (emphasis added).
80. Permanent Rep. of Saudi Arabia to the U.N., Identical letters dated 22 December 2017 from
the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the SecretaryGeneral and the President of the Security Council, 2, U.N. Doc. S/2017/1133 (Dec. 26, 2017)
(emphasis added).
81. Statement of Zimmerman, supra note 68, at 7.
82. H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 3 (as Engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016).
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obfuscates the basis for disagreements between USCIRF and the State
Department over NSA and EPC status.
For example, to what extent is state control a factor that helps explain why
USCIRF has to date failed to recommend al-Qa’ida, AQAP, Boko Haram, or
Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) as EPCs? USCIRF asserts it will
continue “to report . . . on particularly severe violations of religious freedom
perpetrated by nonstate actors that do not meet [IRFA’s] definition because, for
example, they do not exercise territorial control” and “significant political
power.”83 But this additional reporting effort, however laudable, does not
translate into any useful guidance regarding the factors that may have been
determinative in excluding such groups from IRFA scrutiny. By the same
token, did the State Department adequately consider evidence pointing to state
control before proceeding to designate these groups as EPCs? Further, was the
relevant standard applied consistently? Without either institutional actor
providing even a rudimentary explanation or a transparent and consistent
analysis regarding state control, it is impossible to determine with any degree
of certainty what role, if any, the issue played in satisfying (or not satisfying)
IRFA’s NSA requirements.
According to Vittori, who proposes that NSA autonomy be measured on a
spectrum ranging from low, to medium, to high,84 clarifying “[i]nstitutional
variation in regards to the origins of the resources [an NSA] has access to, and
whether that funding is internal or external to the organization” is critical.85 A
typical “low autonomy” NSA is “embodied by state-sponsored terrorism.” A
medium autonomy NSA enjoys “substantial access to further external
resourcing or its own internal assets. In these circumstances, the donor—be it
a state or another terrorist organization—has a substantial influence . . . but
does not have outright control.”86 Finally, a high autonomy NSA “is subject to
little or no control from any group or state, as most of its resourcing comes from
a highly diversified network of internal sources.”87
This yardstick is helpful for refining questions surrounding Boko Haram.
In contrast to groups like the Taliban, al-Shabaab and the Houthis, Boko Haram
signals that an NSA can more definitively reflect evidence of “no clear signs of

83. USCIRF 2019 REPORT, supra note 15, at 6; USCIRF 2018 REPORT, supra note 12, at 4;
USCIRF 2017 REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
84. Vittori, supra note 47, at 449.
85. Id. at 446.
86. Id. at 448.
87. Id.
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any state support[] . . . financially or logistically.”88 Additionally, unlike alShabaab, Boko Haram also fails to evidence significant external levels of
“support from expatriates living in the United States” or elsewhere, that might
be condoned or actively facilitated by the state in question.89 Based on the
internal nature of Boko Haram’s sources of financing, the NSA would clearly
appear to satisfy Vittori’s criteria for high autonomy.
But despite this seemingly clear-cut example of an NSA fully detached
from government control and external sources of support, the State Department
and USCIRF have offered up conflicting classifications for the group, with
neither weighing in on the basis for such a split.90 Further, because USCIRF
has provided no elaboration regarding which specific IRFA requirement Boko
Haram has failed to meet, we are left to speculate about whether the
Commission’s view on state control is at issue, or whether Boko Haram fell
short of IRFA’s other NSA requirements.91
Questions surrounding how state control is evaluated are equally evidenced
by looking at the treatment of NSAs outside the current list of designated EPCs.
For example, to what extent did the element of Russian government support
operate to disqualify the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk
People’s Republic (LPR) from scrutiny as NSAs under IRFA?92 Did this
scenario establish effective state control over an NSA? Both USCIRF and the
State Department have offered accountings of DPR and LPR violations of
88. DANIEL TORBJOR
̈ NSSON & MICHAEL JONSSON, SWEDISH DEFENCE RESEARCH AGENCY,
BOKO HARAM: ON THE VERGE OF DEFEAT OR A LONG TERM THREAT? 49 (2017),
https://www.foi.se/report-summary?reportNo=FOI-R--4488--SE [https://perma.cc/VN8G-JA2H].
89. JOHN CAMPBELL, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. POLICY TO COUNTER NIGERIA’S
BOKO HARAM 19 (2014), https://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Nigeria_CSR70.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V4YC-3QSW]; see also LAUREN PLOCH BLANCHARD & KATIA T. CAVIGELLI,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BOKO HARAM AND THE ISLAMIC STATE’S WEST AFRICA PROVINCE 2
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10173.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EZS-HAY6] (noting “Experts
suggest Boko Haram funds its operations largely through criminal activity, including bank robberies,
kidnappings, assassinations for hire, trafficking, cattle rustling, and extortion.”); AMY PATE, NAT’L
CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, BOKO HARAM: AN
ASSESSMENT OF STRENGTHS, VULNERABILITIES, AND POLICY OPTIONS 23 (2014),
www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_%20SMAAFRICOM_Boko%20Haram%20Deep%20Dive_Jan2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PP4S-EQ3R]
(summarizing Boko Haram’s key financing as derived from “extortion and protection rackets, bank
robbery, looting, and kidnapping for ransom.”).
90. See USCIRF 2019 REPORT, supra note 15, at 6–7.
91. See U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8525, supra note 79.
92. For a more detailed consideration of this question, see Robert C. Blitt, The United States
International Religious Freedom Act, Nonstate Actors, and the Donbas Crisis, in RELIGION DURING
THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT 86, 86–104 (Elizabeth A. Clark & Dmytro Vovk, eds., 2019)
[hereinafter Blitt, Donbas Crisis].

BLITT_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE)

568

1/24/2020 4:53 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[103:547

religious freedom.93 But neither has provided an explicit analysis or
explanation for why these groups are not EPCs or whether, for that matter, they
even satisfy IRFA’s NSA requirements to merit its scrutiny. What factors did
USCIRF and the State Department weigh to reach their determinations, and did
their approaches differ in either case? Continuing this line of inquiry, in parsing
the divide between state support and control, did IRFA’s institutional actors
apply the same analysis to the Houthi-Iran relationship, where Iran’s “material
support is seen as critical to the rebels’ successes”?94 Likewise, what factors
were determinative for each in drawing a distinction between Russia’s
purported control of Ukraine’s breakaway republics and its mere support for
the Taliban, however “assertive” and bestowing of legitimacy and operational
flexibility that latter support might be?95
Nothing in the analysis presented above indicates that USCIRF or the State
Department has affirmatively endorsed the “effective control” test or justified
it as reflective of Congressional intent. That said, based on the steady practice
of adopting EPC recommendations and designations for NSAs evidencing
varying degrees of state support, the case can be made that both actors have at
least implicitly adopted this approach, albeit without the benefit of an
accompanying formal methodology. To be clear, applying the “effective
control” standard is not necessarily detrimental and may even afford certain
advantages. After all, by imposing a more rigid test for government control,
USCIRF and the State Department can arguably scrutinize more NSAs under
IRFA. Greater scrutiny of NSAs in turn serves IRFA’s purpose of
demonstrating “the unwavering commitment of the United States to religious
freedom and the desire of the United States for the most effective and principled
response . . . .”96 This approach also clearly signals the view of the U.S.
government that when an NSA’s actions are attributed to the state by a showing
of effective control, accountability for any internationally wrongful acts will
necessarily flow to that state under international law norms.
At the same time, adopting this strict effective control test is not drawbackfree. In the first instance, limiting the ability of IRFA to expressly call out a
93. USCIRF 2019 REPORT, supra note 15, at 87; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy,
H.R. and Lab., Ukraine 2018 International Religious Freedom Report 2, 15–19 (2018),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/UKRAINE-2018-INTERNATIONALRELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6JZ-8QKH].
94. Watkins, Grim, & Ahmed, supra note 66.
95. The Situation in Afghanistan: Statement Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 115th Cong. 10
(2017) (statement of General John W. Nicholson, Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan),
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Nicholson_02-09-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9B48-7KSC].
96. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(b)(1)(C) (2018).
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state-controlled NSA for violations of religious freedom (including particularly
severe ones) may unintentionally harm the victims, who may be better served
by having perpetrators directly named and punished rather than having
international rules of attribution respected. Second, it seems contrary to IRFA’s
spirit to deny the statute’s ability to scrutinize—and designate as EPCs where
necessary—even those NSAs that are deemed to be under a state’s control.
Further, such a move would not appear to preempt appropriate additional action
based on state attribution principles.
More profoundly, maintaining a strict test for state control may afford
certain NSAs with a high degree of state support a pass with respect to punitive
measures. IRFA requires executive action be directed at states identified as
“countries of particular concern” (CPC) for “particularly severe violations of
religious freedom.”97 In the case of EPCs, however, similar consequences are
optional rather than mandatory.98 IRFA asks only that the President “should
take specific actions, when practicable, to address severe violations of religious
freedom of non-state actors that are designated” EPCs.99 This “baked in”
differential treatment between CPCs and EPCs is confirmed in practice, given
that no IRFA-justified presidential actions have followed EPC designations to
date.100
In addition, restricting the number of NSAs identified as state-controlled
may also result in the denial of certain asylum claims premised on NSA
violations of international human rights law (IHRL). As noted below, the
impact of this latter risk, however, may be overstated. Under the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT), the offense of torture is defined as “any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally . . . inflicted by
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity.”101 Similarly, the undertaking to
prevent cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment is limited to “when such acts
are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”102 Thus,
97. Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 114–281, § 302, 130 Stat.
1426, 1434 (2016) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6442(b) (2018)).
98. 22 U.S.C. § 6442a(c) (2018).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. See, e.g., USCIRF 2019 REPORT, supra note 15, at 15; USCIRF 2018 REPORT, supra note
12, at 12; USCIRF 2017 REPORT, supra note 8, at 13.
101. G.A. Res. 39/46, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, at art. 1(1), (Dec. 10, 1984).
102. Id. at art. 16(1); 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2019).
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although securing relief under the CAT “does not require a nexus to a protected
ground”103—such as a particular belief or immutable characteristic104—it does
demand a nexus to official action or color of law.
The practice of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reflects this
requirement and illustrates the difficulty in establishing “official capacity” in
cases where alleged CAT abuses occur at the hand of autonomous NSAs. For
example, in Perinpanathan v. INS, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a BIA decision
that petitioner was ineligible for relief because he could not “successfully argue
that he fears he will be tortured by the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam]
under the [CAT] because the LTTE is an illegal terrorist organization, and its
participants cannot be considered government officials.”105 In line with
requiring an alien seeking protection under the CAT to show, inter alia, a
governmental role or acquiescence,106 BIA has determined that “torture covers
intentional governmental acts, not negligent acts or acts by private individuals
not acting on behalf of the government,”107 and that “[v]iolence committed by
individuals over whom the government has no reasonable control does not
implicate the [CAT].”108 This interpretation corresponds to the executive
branch’s understanding that “the Convention applies only to torture that occurs
in the context of governmental authority, excluding torture that occurs as a
wholly private act or, in terms more familiar in U.S. law, it applies to torture
inflicted ‘under color of law.’”109
Faced with this prevailing interpretation, a petitioner advancing a CATbased claim for protection against an NSA “certified” under IRFA as being free
of government control may have a difficult time showing CAT’s requisite nexus
to “official” action. Still, cracks appear to be emerging in this approach. One
concurring opinion in In re S-V- acknowledged that “for immigration purposes,
the term ‘government’ is not limited to political units we recognize as valid.
Rather, it includes ‘a political organization that exercises power on behalf of

103. Butt v. Barr, 776 F. App’x 12, 15–16 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)
(2019)).
104. Hana v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 39, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting “there need not be any
connection between the likely torture and the alien’s religion (or race, or political opinions, etc.”).
105. Perinpanathan v. INS, 310 F.3d 594, 599 (8th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
106. In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 291 (B.I.A. 2002).
107. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
108. In re Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 280 (Att’y Gen. 2002).
109. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100–
20, at 4 (1988).
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the people subjected to its jurisdiction.’”110 A separate concurring and
dissenting opinion in the same case observed: “There is also an open question
as to when, if ever, the loss of internal control by an existing government can
amount to ‘acquiescence’ that invokes the protections of the [CAT].”111
In addition to these openings, IRFA’s substance gives rise to an additional
potential basis for triggering the CAT obligations. Since IRFA seeks to impose
IHRL obligations on autonomous NSAs, it arguably follows that other third
party IHRL obligations—including the duty of non refoulement—are equally
operational.112
A similar openness to equating NSA actions with “official” violations under
the CAT is evident on the international level as well. For example, in S.S. Elmi
v. Australia, the UN Committee Against Torture rejected Australia’s contention
that the CAT did not “extend to private individuals acting in a non-official
capacity, such as members of Somali armed bands.”113 Instead, the Committee
reasoned:
some of the factions operating in Mogadishu have set up quasigovernmental institutions . . . . It follows then that, de facto,
those factions exercise certain prerogatives that are
comparable to those normally exercised by legitimate
governments. Accordingly, the members of those factions can
fall, for the purposes of the application of the Convention,
within the phrase “public officials or other persons acting in an
official capacity” contained in article 1.114
110. In re S-V-, Interim Decision #3430, 1306, 1314 (B.I.A. 2000) (Villageliu, Bd. Member,
concurring) (citing Matter of Linnas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 302, 307 (B.I.A. 1985)). According to Villageliu,
the record in In re S-V- showed “the Colombian rebels control approximately 40 percent of that
country’s territory, and those rebels may well be considered part of a government participating or
acquiescing in the torture of an individual within its territory.” Id. at 1315.
111. Id. at 1316. (Schmidt, Chairman, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112. The issue of NSA obligations under IHRL is discussed at greater length below. See infra
Part V.
113. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 22nd Sess., Communication No. 120/1998, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, ¶¶ 4.8, 6.5 (May 25, 1999).
114. Id. ¶ 6.5 (emphasis added). In a similar vein, the European Court of Human Rights has
taken the view that the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Article 3 prohibition on torture and ill-treatment extends to acts of certain private parties.
Although a majority ultimately rejected the petitioner’s claim that deportation would trigger an Article
3 violation, it nevertheless recognized that because of “the absolute character of the right guaranteed,”
Article 3 applied not only to the danger emanating from State authorities but also “where the danger
emanates from persons or groups of persons who are not public officials. However, it must be shown
that the risk is real and that the authorities of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by
providing appropriate protection.” H.L.R. v. France, App. No. 24573/94, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, ¶ 40
(1997). More recently, the Court reaffirmed this view while also concluding that the petitioners’
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Applying this standard, the Committee found that a member of the Shikal
clan merited CAT protection from the Hawiye clan because “the area of
Mogadishu where the Shikal mainly reside” was under the “effective control”
of the latter group, which had “established quasi-governmental institutions and
provide[d] a number of public services.”115
As it stands, the possibility remains that IRFA’s “certification” of
autonomous NSAs may have a chilling effect on CAT-based claims for
protection that seek to equate NSA action with “official” government action.
Still, even if this door is closed, asylum protection from autonomous NSAs
remains available under an Immigration and Nationality Act-based claim
grounded on “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”116 Unlike the CAT, securing this protection does require a nexus to a
protected ground.117 But given IRFA’s subject matter, this hurdle is unlikely to
present a major obstacle. More directly, this form of asylum protection eschews
the need for the CAT’s tie-back to official action. As the BIA has noted: “we
have granted asylum to applicants who feared persecution at the hands of
nongovernmental entities where the applicant demonstrated that government
authorities were unable to provide protection from the would-be
persecutors.”118
The Second Circuit has confirmed this approach: “we have never held that
direct governmental action is required to make out a claim of persecution. On
the contrary, it is well established that private acts may be persecution if the
government has proved unwilling to control such actions.”119 As an outgrowth
of this practice, U.S. courts have recognized a wide range of actors as being
capable of persecution, including a variety of NSAs such as paramilitary groups

deportation to Iraq would give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention based on “a strong
indication that they would continue to be at risk from non-State actors in Iraq,” including ill-treatment
by al-Qaeda. J.K. and Others v. Sweden, App. No. 59166/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 8, 114 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-165442 [https://perma.cc/KA7L-VHW4].
115. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, supra note 113, ¶ 6.7.
The Committee’s perspective raises the intriguing possibility that a finding of “effective control” will
in turn lend NSA activities the imprimatur of “official capacity” under the CAT.
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018).
117. Id.; see also Butt v. Barr, 776 F. App’x 12, 15–16 (2d Cir. 2019).
118. In re S-V-, Interim Decision #3430, 1306, 1312 (B.I.A. 2000) (citing Matter of Kasinga, 21
I & N Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996)).
119. Pavlova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
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and warring factions,120 clans and sects,121 and individual family members.122
And while the current administration has sought to render the credible fear
standard more onerous for petitions premised on NSA persecution, the judicial
branch has thus far rejected these efforts.123
V. APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS TO NSAS
Based on the analysis above, the de facto use of an effective control test
under IRFA need not trigger detrimental fallout for individuals seeking
protection from religious persecution at the hands of autonomous NSAs. Still,
the unresolved ambiguity surrounding the state control requirement and the
120. Matter of Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142, 142–43 (B.I.A. 1990) (recognizing well-founded
fear of harm can attach to paramilitary groups based on political affiliation). In In re N-M-A-, the
Board did not reject premise of applicant’s argument that he had a well-founded fear of persecution
from various “mujahidin factions,” but found he failed to meet “his burden of proving that the various
mujahidin factions might take reprisals against him.” In re N-M-A-, Interim Decision #3368, 312,
322–23 (B.I.A. 1998).
121. Matter of D-I-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 448, 448 (B.I.A. 2008) (recognizing the Mungiki sect in
Kenya as capable of giving rise to respondent’s well-founded fear of persecution); In re H-, Interim
Decision #3276, 337, 337 (B.I.A. 1996) (recognizing well-founded fear can stem from clan-based
persecution).
122. In re S-A-, Interim Decision #3433, 1328, 1336 (B.I.A. 2000) (granting asylum based on
finding “the persecution suffered by the respondent was on account of her religious beliefs, as they
differed from those of her father concerning the proper role of women in Moroccan society.”).
123. In June 2018, the Attorney General of the United States held that “An applicant seeking to
establish persecution based on violent conduct of a private actor must show more than the
government’s difficulty controlling private behavior. The applicant must show that the government
condoned the private actions or demonstrated an inability to protect the victims.” Matter of A-B-, 27
I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (emphasis added). A subsequent Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Policy Memorandum adopted this standard as guidance for its agents. U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PM-602-0162, POLICY
MEMORANDUM: GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR, CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM, AND
REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF A-B- 1 (July 11, 2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/2018-06-18-PM-602-0162-USCIS-MemorandumMatter-of-A-B.PDF [https://perma.cc/DD55-84NE]. Several months later, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia concluded that the majority of the new credible fear policies articulated by
the Attorney General and the USCIS Policy Memorandum—including the requirement that asylum
applicants demonstrate that the “home government . . . either condone[d] the [persecution] or
demonstrate[d] a complete helplessness to protect victims of such alleged persecution”—were arbitrary
and capricious, and violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and Nationality
Act. Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 129, 146 (D.D.C. 2018). According to Judge Emmet G.
Sullivan, “under the government’s formulation . . . no asylum applicant who received assistance from
the government, regardless of how ineffective that assistance was, could meet the persecution
requirement when the persecutor is a non-government actor . . . . That is simply not the law.” Id. at
129. The administration has appealed the district court’s ruling. Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d
96 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal docketed sub nom., Grace v. Barr, No. 19-5013 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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uncertain methodology used to establish which NSAs are indeed free from such
control continue to expose IRFA’s implementation to unnecessary opacity,
inconsistency, and incoherence. Further complicating this—and independent
of whether a strict effective control test in fact governs—IRFA and its
institutional actors have left unaddressed the overhanging question of how
obligations for autonomous non-state actors flow from international human
rights law.
As noted above, identifying an NSA as state-controlled triggers generally
predictable attribution rules. And while the precise measure for control may be
subject to some debate, once control is triggered, all relevant international
human rights obligations—whether under customary international law or
treaties which the state has ratified—flow to the NSA: “Insofar as [NSAs] are
empowered by the state, act according to its instructions, directions or control,
or effectively replace it, the state is internationally responsible for those acts.”124
These rules of attribution and their consequent attachment of human rights
obligations to state-controlled NSAs, however, do not operate as clearly in the
context of autonomous NSAs. Some consensus exists around the application
of international humanitarian law and international criminal law norms to nonstate actors.125 But even if such norms do apply, they fail to cover the field of
possible abuses falling under IRFA,126 including violations of basic freedoms
such as the right to change one’s religion or belief and the right not to be
compelled to reveal one’s thoughts or adherence to any religion or belief.127
Extending IHRL obligations to NSAs is fraught with even greater
controversy. One of the main reasons driving the hesitancy to apply IHRL is
that NSAs are not a party to core international human rights treaties such as the
CAT or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).128
124. Yael Ronen, Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State Actors, 46 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 21, 23 (2013).
125. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations, 88
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 491, 492–93, 498–99 (2006). This recognition has been grudging, because “to
admit such a situation is seen as an admission that the government has lost a degree of control and as
an ‘elevation’ of the status of the rebels.” Id. at 493.
126. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations for Non-State-Actors: Where are We Now?,
in DOING PEACE THE RIGHTS WAY: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS IN HONOUR OF
LOUISE ARBOUR 11, 16 (Fannie Lafontaine & François Larocque eds., 2019) [hereinafter Clapham,
Where Are We Now?]
127. High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Comment on Freedom of Thought, Conscience
and Religion, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (1993).
128. See Convention Against Torture and Other Crime, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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Another factor stems from state concern that an extension of such obligations
might strengthen NSA claim for status, recognition, and legitimacy within the
international system.129
Therefore, however well-intentioned the effort to impose similar
obligations on autonomous NSAs under IRFA may be, it necessarily confronts
a major challenge with the international system. As Liesbeth Zegveld observed
nearly twenty years ago:
International practice is . . . ambiguous on the question of
conditions for accountability of armed opposition groups for
violations of human rights law.
....
These norms presume the existence of a government, or at
least, an entity exercising governmental functions. Armed
opposition groups rarely function as de facto governments.130
Indicative of this ambiguity, a 2006 UN Special Rapporteur report
proclaimed that “it is especially appropriate and feasible to call for an armed
group to respect human rights norms when it ‘exercises significant control over
territory and population and has an identifiable political structure.’”131 From
the Special Rapporteur’s perspective, it had already become “increasingly
understood . . . that the human rights expectations of the international
community operate to protect people” and that imposing these obligations do
not by themselves affect “the legitimacy of the actors to whom they are
addressed.”132

129. For example, see Władysław Czapliński, Recognition and International Legal Personality
of Non- State Actors, 2016/I PÉCS J. INT’L & EUR. L. 7, 14 (2016) (“If recognition is the source of
international legal personality of non-state actors, it should imply the obligation not to recognize those
entities, the establishing and activities of which are unlawful.”). But see High Comm’r for Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, supra note 127 (suggesting that the issue of international
legal personality can be separated from the provision of certain rights and obligations).
130. LIESBETH ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 151–52 (2002).
131. Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur), Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of
Disappearances and Summary Executions, ¶ 26, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5 (Mar. 27, 2006).
The Rapporteur’s view reinforces the approach noted by the CAT Committee. See generally U.N.
Comm. Against Torture, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, supra note 113. This observation also
suggests that the justification for applying IHRL obligations to autonomous NSAs reflected in IRFA
may flow from its requirement that they also demonstrate “significant political power and territorial
control.” 22 U.S.C. § 6402(11)(a) (2018). But neither USCIRF nor the State Department allude to
this factor as a justification for imposing such obligations. See Secretary of State’s Determination,
supra note 10; USCIRF 2018 REPORT, supra note 12, at 4.
132. Alston, supra note 131, ¶ 27.
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Despite this and other “tentative steps” to attach human rights obligations
to NSAs with territorial control, the approach remains subject to pushback.
According to one scholar:
[C]ustomary international human rights law does not seem to
extend beyond states, nor, obviously, does treaty
law. . . . [E]ffective territorial control and the exercise of
public functions are not sufficient for states to consider an
entity bound by international human rights law. Other
normative and institutional factors are also at play.133
Indeed, efforts to impose NSA obligations still register as alien to the
traditional state-centric nature often ascribed to international law. Although the
UN Security Council has directed numerous resolutions at NSAs, these actions
remain “in a way special, as according to Art. 48 (2) of the U.N. Charter
exclusively the states are obligated to obey to the decisions of the
Organization.”134 Still, as Clapham succinctly if cautiously concludes: “A
reading of international law that would deny that ISIS has perpetrated any
violations of international human rights law seems unsustainable today.”135
The state of flux surrounding the application of IHRL norms to autonomous
NSAs makes the need for clear guidance and explanation from USCIRF and
the State Department even more urgent. Precisely what legal norm does IRFA
rely on for imposing human rights obligations on autonomous NSAs? IRFA
itself is silent on this specific question. While it may be argued that the statute
seeks to enforce U.S. rather than international law, the reality remains that
IRFA’s premise is grounded in promoting and protecting the right to freedom
or belief as defined under core international instruments. Therefore, the task of
identifying autonomous NSAs in violation of IHRL norms presumably entails
some a priori conviction, however tacit, that these groups are bound to respect
such norms. Yet, the findings underpinning IRFA note that governments
alone—not NSAs—“have the responsibility to protect the fundamental rights
of their citizens and to pursue justice for all.”136 Further, according to IRFA, it
is governments—and not NSAs—that are prohibited from arbitrarily abridging
the fundamental right of every individual to religious freedom.137 Rather than
133. Ronen, supra note 124, at 47–48.
134. Czapliński, supra note 129, at 16. Czapliński suggests passage of these UNSC resolutions
“did not amount to the recognition of international legal personality of the addressees, but granted them
certain powers to act in international relations (rights and obligations), without taking any firm position
towards their status.” Id.
135. Clapham, Where Are We Now?, supra note 126, at 35.
136. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(3) (2018).
137. Id.
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squarely address this overarching issue, USCIRF and the State Department
have opted to embrace the silence.
As Yael Ronen has concluded, “while NSA obligations under human rights
law have not yet crystallized as a customary norm, international law is
progressing towards the establishment of such obligations.”138 From this
perspective, IRFA’s institutional actors have missed a critical opportunity to
advance this crystallization project. Indeed, the failure to invoke justifications
and rationales for applying IHRL obligations to autonomous NSAs potentially
impedes this crystallization effort and moreover, unnecessarily subverts the
legitimacy of efforts to scrutinize these actors through IRFA’s statutory
provisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
IRFA’s newly minted NSA provisions promise a critical tool for responding
to the acute reality that non-state actors increasingly are responsible for
violating the right to freedom of religion or belief. Admittedly, Congressional
negotiations over the substance of these provisions diminished their initial
scope while either preserving or introducing other uncertainties. Three years
later, however, IRFA’s institutional actors—USCIRF and the State
Department—have missed critical opportunities to clarify and shore up these
ambiguities with an eye towards strengthening the viability of IRFA’s response
to violent NSAs.
To illustrate the vagueness and ineffective implementation dogging IRFA’s
NSA provisions, this Article has focused on the statute’s requirement that an
NSA be “outside the control of a sovereign government.” As discussed above,
the statutory language provides a vague and indeterminate departure point.
This ambiguity is exacerbated by fuzzy reporting practices on the part of
USCIRF and the State Department that evidence no clear methodology and, in
any case, betray an apparent divergence in approach. The failure to stabilize
these assessments and render them more transparent is detrimental to the overall
endeavor of scrutinizing NSAs under IRFA and brings the credibility of this
process into doubt.
On balance, the case can be made that IRFA’s institutional actors have
opted to apply a strict “effective control” standard in their assessments of NSA
autonomy. Even if this is the case, because their methodologies lack
transparency and consistent application, the resulting outcomes furnish
inadequate justification, perpetuate vagueness and exacerbate ambiguities,
particularly regarding where the line is drawn between support and control.

138. Ronen, supra note 124, at 50.

BLITT_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE)

578

1/24/2020 4:53 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[103:547

Purposely ambiguous NSA-state relationships that blur the support/control
distinction are likely to persist, fueled in part by the desire of sovereign
governments to maintain plausible deniability concerning the extent of such
relations.139 This reality should be incentive enough for developing a clear
methodology for assessing various forms of support and applying it consistently
in the context of IRFA’s state control requirement.
Should it matter whether a state is supplying weapons, funding or technical
assistance in direct violation of standing Security Council resolutions? As
evidenced above, at least in some cases, such support, even if falling short of
effective control, can exacerbate or perpetuate an NSA-fueled conflict. From
this perspective, the removal, maintenance, or enhancement of government
support for an NSA—at least at certain high levels—can have a direct effect on
an NSA’s ability to act. It stands to reason, therefore, that such levels of support
can amount to a form of control.
To more clearly acknowledge this reality, IRFA’s institutional actors could
opt to construe such forms of support as constituting de facto state control, even
if this does not satisfy the ICJ’s standard of “effective” control. Such an
approach would not be untethered from international developments. Scholars
and international tribunals alike have sought to imbue assessments of state
attribution with greater nuance that in turn might capture a wider spectrum of
state aid and assistance rendered to NSAs.140 To this end, one observer has
proposed adopting “a complicity standard arising from the state’s knowing aid
or assistance to the wrongdoing . . . to complement the existing framework of
attribution of conduct.”141
Part of the effort needed to identify and apply a clear measure for assessing
state control should include a review of what interests and functions are served
by restricting IRFA’s scrutiny of NSAs to those deemed free of state control.
If a sovereign government controls a given NSA, it plainly makes sense to hold
that government accountable for the NSA’s actions. Excluding state-controlled
NSAs from IRFA scrutiny may enable the administration to more clearly
attribute responsibility for these actors to a state sponsor. But any
accountability that flows from this attribution, including CPC designation under
IRFA, should not preclude taking IRFA-based action against the NSA itself,
including EPC designation. Indeed, denying an NSA separate scrutiny because

139. Russia’s involvement in eastern Ukraine’s breakaway republics is a case in point. Blitt,
Donbas Crisis, supra note 92.
140. Lanovoy, supra note 22, at 582 (citing examples from various international tribunals and
legal scholarship).
141. Id. at 566.
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of a finding of state control arguably does a disservice to IRFA’s underlying
purpose and to the victims of the group’s violations.
In addition to the urgent need to clarify the issues that arise in the context
of defining state control, IRFA’s 2016 Wolf Act amendments also fail to
adequately validate the legal basis for attaching IHRL obligations to those
NSAs it “certifies” as autonomous. While the case can be made that
international practice is tilting in favor of applying IHRL obligations to NSAs,
IRFA’s statutory guidance provides little to substantiate such an approach. This
silence is compounded by IRFA’s institutional actors. The failure to
communicate a justification for this presumption exposes IRFA’s newly minted
NSA amendments to unnecessary ambiguity and risks bringing the statute’s
legitimacy into doubt.
Accordingly, alongside the need to elaborate the measure and methodology
for establishing state control, IRFA’s institutional actors should similarly move
to clarify and validate the basis for imposing IHRL obligations on autonomous
NSAs. This process can readily tap into current international trends and help
cement an emerging approach that recognizes the need to delink state concerns
over NSA standing and ensure that human rights are protected for everybody
everywhere.

